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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
OscAR"~ . .JloYLE AXD .JIAY P. ~{oYLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal cor-
poration, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 6328 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
Comes now the appellant, Salt Lake City, above 
named, and hereby petitions this Honorable Court for a 
re-hearing and a re-examination and re-determination 
of the issues presented by the appeal herein and of the 
Court's opinion and ruling thereon in its decision on said 
appeal. This petition is based upon the following 
grounds, to-wit: 
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1. The opinion and ruling of the Court are contrary 
to the undisputed facts in the case and is wholly without 
support in the evidence wherein the opinion states as 
facts that Moyle "had other irrigation rights (that is, 
water other than the 223;4 shares involved in this case) 
which he used for irrigating his crops, and which was 
sufficient for that purpose. The water right herein 
involved '.was a right in excess of what he required for 
irrigation during those years (1926-1939), which he could 
have sold or rented had the City not taken the water." 
2. That the opinion and ruling of the Court are 
contrary to the undisputed facts in the case and are 
wholly without support in the evidence wherein the opin-
ion holds fallacious the argument that because this water 
was not turned into the City Conduit, the City did not 
have possession thereof and states as a fact that "the 
record shows conclusively that all creek water not di-
verted into the City mains under the exchange agreement 
was used by the City in supplying to the Corporation the 
volume of water it was obligated to supply the 
Corporation.'' 
3. That the opinion and ruling of the Court are 
contrary to the undisputed facts in the case and are 
wholly without support in the evidence wherein the opin-
ion states as a fact that "after the City obtained the 
order for possession, Moyles did not draw or use any 
water represented by the water rights involved in this 
action.'' 
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-l. That the opinion and ruling of the Court are con-
trary to the undisputed fads in the case and are wholly 
without support in the evidence wherein the Court states 
that · • the eYidence justifies the finding and con elusion 
of the triers of the fads that the City had possession and 
use of the water rights here involved during the period of 
time involved in this action,., and said statement is 
contradictory to the finding and state1nent in the opin-
ion that during 1936-1937-1938, the Big Cottonwood Tan-
ner Ditch Cmnpany did not issue ''to Moyles a time or 
turn ticket for the 22% shares of water here involved, 
but distributed that tin1e and water to other stock holders 
in the Corporation," which clearly shows that the City 
did not possess the water during those years and that it 
was the Cmnpany "\vho allowed some other stock holders 
to use ~[oyle's water in those years 
5. That the opinion and ruling of the Court are 
contrary to the undisputed, facts in the case and are 
·wholly without support in the evidence wherein it holds 
as ''specious argument'' the point made by the City 
that after the order granting the City possession, ~'[oyle 
was still issued tickets by the water master for his irri-
gation turns the same as before the order, and, there-
fore, he \Yas deprived of no water, and in concluding that 
~~ o~Tle ·was deprived of his water whereas the undisputed 
facts in evidence show that Moyle not only rec~ived 
tickets for his water turns the same after as before the 
order for possession, but he actually used the water EO 
ticketed to him for irrigation every season except the 
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years 1936, 1937, 1938, when at his own request no tickets 
were issued to him. 
6. rrhe Court erred in holding that until the order 
of possession was vacated and set aside, it became Moyle's 
duty to exercise no control over the property (water) 
and to not use the water, as such order of possession was 
not self-executing and it was entirely within the right 
of the City not to take Moyle's water at any time and 
it was l\tfoyle 's duty in order to Initigate damages, to 
take and use his water whenever the City was not using 
it and it was made available to him for his use and benefit 
both by the City and by the Ditch Company. The undis-
puted testimony shows that in three of the years on]y 
creek water was turned into the Tanner Ditch and dur-
ing all but a short period from July to October in each 
year only creek water flowed in the Ditch and during all 
of that time Moyle's water was available to him and 
was ticketed to him in turns and was used by him. And 
further, the only time "lake juice," as the opinion 
euphemiously describes it, was turned into the Tanner 
Ditch was during July, August, September, and part of 
October, and if such commingling of water constituted 
a taking pro tanto then the Court should have decreased 
the judgment to reflect that pro tanto taking and not have 
sustained a judgment for the full yearly rental value of 
the water. 
7. The Court erred in affirming the judgment in 
the sum of $4769.75 as included in said sum is the sum 
of $350.00 awarded as damages accruing between the 
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time of the comn1encing the action and the time of trial, 
which award is not sustained or authorized by any sup-
plenlental or additional pleadings and is not recoverable 
in a law action, and for the further reason that such 
damages did not accrue by reason of any taking of water 
by the City under the order for possession as such order 
was dismissed long prior to the filing of the complaint 
herein and the rule of damages in eminent domain would 
not apply to such period of time. 
8. The Court erred in failing to hold that by reason 
of plaintiff's failure to protest the application of Salt 
Lake City to the State Engineer of Utah to change the 
point of diversion of the water of the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch from the head of that ditch to the head 
of the City conduit, and to appeal from the order of 
the Engineer granting such application, the plaintiffs 
are estopped to object to the City operating under said 
exchange agreement and may not now recover damages 
which result, not from the City actually taking plaintiff's 
water, but from a carrying out of said exchange agree-
ment. 
9. The Court erred in holding that the corpus of 
the water was the thing withheld from plaintiffs by the 
City under the order for possession, whereas all that 
plaintiffs were or could have been deprived of was the 
right to use that certain quantity of water for culinary, 
domestic, and irrigation purposes which the said 22~(± 
shares represented. 
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' 10. The Court erred in holding that tlie water right 
which the City interferred with in this caRe was a right 
wholly consisting of potable water even though it had 
· been used by plaintiffs me~ely for irrigation purpo~es, 
and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the basis 
of the highest and possible use to which said water 
could have been put under any possibility though differ-
ent from the use made by the plaintiffs and in failing to 
restrict recovery to the value of said water based upon 
the character of the use to which plaintiffs had been and 
were actually putting said water at the time the order of 
possession was granted. 
11. The Court erred in adopting and applying to 
this case as the rule for fixing the measure of damages 
the rule applicable to a case where the taking is a per-
manent one and involves real or tangible property which 
has value and substance not necessarily based upon pres-
ent use, whereas the property right here involved is a 
right existing only by virtue of and based upon benefi-
cial use, which beneficial use fixes both the character, 
nature and extent as well as the value of the right or 
property taken. 
12. The Court erred in failing to hold that, during 
all of the time complained of by plaintiffs, they did re-
ceive all the identical clear and potable creek water to 
which they were entitled under their 22%, shares for 
culinary domestic and stock watering purposes through 
the pipe system installed under the exchange agreement, 
and in failing to reverse the judgment of the trial court 
for the reason that the amount awarded by the trial 
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court includes damages for deprivation of the entire 
quantity of water, including culinary, don1estjc, and 
stock watering \Vater, to which plaintiffs would be en-
titled to under said 22% shares. 
13. That the Court erred In concluding that the 
assignments of error presented only two questions for 
consideration of the Court, viz., whether the complaint 
stated a cause of action and what is the measure of 
damages, and in failing to consider and express its opin-
ion on assignments of error as follows : 
(a) ~-\ssignment of error No. XII wherein error is 
assigned in the trial court entering judgment for the 
return of 223;4 shares of water right in the Big Cotton-
wood Stream, when all the evidence shows that ~Ioyle 
did not own any such shares of water right in the Big 
Cottonwood Stream but only owned 223,4 shares in the 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch which in turn was entitled 
to a certain. proportion of the Big Cottonwood Stream 
and such judgment is predjudicial and n1isleading and 
ought to ·he modified to state :Moyle's true interest. 
(b) Assignment of error No. XIII wherein erro: 
is assigned in the trial court adjudging and decreeing 
that plaintiffs' water rights were the same water as 
that decreed to Oscar W. Moyle in the case of Progress 
Company vs. SaDt Lake City, and in paragraph seven of 
the -decree in the case of Big Cottonwood TanneT Dttch 
Company vs. Vincent Shurtliff as no such decree was 
necessary to the determination of the issues of thi~ case 
and there is no evidence to sustain such de termination. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
(c) Assignment of error No. XIV wherein error is 
assigned in the trial court decreeing that the plaintiffs 
recover from defendant the use and possession of the 
water of Big Cottonwood Stream described as 22%, 
shares of water right in said stream as plaintiffs own 
no such right and it would be impossible to enforce such 
decree or to know when plaintiffs were actually re-
ceiving the water to which they are entitled under the 
shares involved in this action under that description 
and to allow such fallacious judgment to stand would 
be prejudicial and a source of confusion and uncertainty. 
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit that 
this petition for rehearing should be granted and the 
cause set for rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. RAY CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistunts. 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
HOMER HOLMGREN hereby certifies that he is 
one of the counsel for the petitioner named in the fore-
going petition for re-hearing; that in his judgment ;:;aid 
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought therein and that 
said petition is well taken in point of law and in fact 
and that the same is not imposed for the purpose of delay. 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REH.EAHING 
I 
GEXERAL ST~\TEMENT OF FACTS 
Nince our petition for rehearing is directed to such 
a large extent to what we claim to be erroneous fact con-
clusions stated in the opinion and since if such fact con-
clusions are erroneous there is no basis for the deci.;ion 
as 1nade it becon1es necessary and extremely important 
that the record be carefully and thoroughly reviewed in 
this brief.- 'Ve realize this is repetitious but we earnestly 
solicit the attention of the Court to this review for we 
feel certain it will demonstrate the errors we have 
assigned. 
Ever since 1848 the water flowing in Big Cotton-
wood Creek has played an important part in the settle-
ment and development of the Salt Lake Valley. In that 
year the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch was constructed 
to divert a part of the creek flow to supply water for 
domestic and irrigation purposes to about 1800 acres of 
land. The right to the use of this water continued in 
individual ownership until 1903 when the Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch Company was organized. All but a 
few of the individual water users transferred their water 
rights to this corporation and received certificates of 
stock therefor. The articles of incorporation (introduced 
in evidence as a part of the files in Case No. 31665, ex-
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hi bit C) provided for two branches known as ''~fain 
Branch" and "North Branch." Under Article XXI, the 
stock certificates must show on their face from what 
particular branch or fork the owner shall be entitled to 
water, and. he shall not be allowed the use of water from 
any other branch or fork except that shown on his stock 
certificate, and no stock holder shall, be allowed to trans-
fer or sell any capital stock to another branch, ditch, 
canal, or other conduit without the consent of at least tw0 
th1irds of the issued stock to the branch or fork from 
which said stock is transferred as shown by the books 
of the company. 
In 1911 an action was commenced by the Big Cot-
tonwood Tanner Ditch Company in ·which the right~ to 
the use of the water in the said Tanner Ditch were ad-
judicated. The files in this action, Big Cottonwood Tan-
ner Ditch Company vs. Vincent Shurtliff, et al, case No. 
14230, and in which Oscar W. Moyle was a party de-
fendant, were admitted in evidence in the instant case 
as exhibit 2·. In that case in paragraphs 4 and 5 of tht 
Findings of Fact (abstract, Page 87 and 88) the Court 
found as follows: 
''4th. That for the purpose of fairly, effec-
tively and equitably distributing said waters to 
the stockholders in the said The Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Company and owners in said ditch, 
it has been the custom ever since the construction 
thereof to distribute to each one his proportion 
thereof by distributing to each one all of the 
stream flowing in a branch or branches of sai<l 
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ditch for a definitely stated period of tilne or a 
definite fractional part thereof for a definite 
period of thne, which said custmn is now and has 
been a n1atter of necessary regulation in order. 
that the said water nu1.y he distributed equitably 
and be used beneficially. 
''5th. That ever since the organization of 
said The Big Cotton Tanner Ditch Company, the 
Board of Directors of said corporation, by author-
ity delegated to them by the stockholders of said 
corporation and the owners of water rights in 
said ditch who were not members of said corpora-
tion, have managed and controlled said ditch, 
elected water masters, and thereby apportioned 
and distributed the water of said ditch to the 
stockholders of the said corporation and the 
owners of water rights in said ditch who were not 
stockholders thereof, according to their respective 
shares therein, so as to secure a proper distribu-
tion and beneficial use of said waters.'' 
The evidence in the instant case shows without dis-
pute that this same custom in management and di;;:;trihu-
tion still continues. 
In 1920 Salt Lake City, being in need of additional 
water fit for domestic and culinary uses, negotiated with 
the Company to exchange water obtained by the City 
from Utah Lake, and fit for irrigation purposes, for the 
Cottonwood Creek water held by the Company, the Com-
pany to receive piped creek water for culinary and do-
mestic use. Practically all of the stock holders of the 
Company were willing and anxious to effect such an ex-
change, among other reasons, so that they could obtain 
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water, properly treated, in pipes under pressure for do-
mestic and culinary use and an additional amount of 
irrigation water during the late summer months when 
the creek supply became low and inadequate. At that 
time, Mr. Moyle was the owner of 2314 shares of capital 
stock of the Company and he and a few others whose 
lands were situated high on the Ditch, objected to the 
exchange. However, the exchange agreement was duly 
entered into January 2, 1920. 
Under the agreement the Company transferred to 
the City the right to take and use perpetually from Big 
Cottonwood Creek all of the water of said Creek to which 
the Company was or might be entitled, except 2.491 
second feet during April, May, June, July, August, and 
September, and 1.438 second feet during the other months 
of the year, called "culinary water." The City agreed 
to install a pipe line system and furnish and deliver 
this culinary water pure and wholesome through such 
system over the area served by the Tanner Ditch, a 
very considerable system as shown by the agreement. 
The City also agreed to furnish and deliver to the Com-
pany irrigation water during the months of April, May, 
and June in quantity equal to the flow to which the 
Company was entitled from the creek, and during July, 
30 second feet, August, 28 second feet, September, 26 
second feet, and the first fifteen days in October, 15 
second feet. The water available to the City from which 
to supply this irrigation water was Utah Lake water, 
and this required the installation of a pumping plant and 
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pipe line to plunp the lake water from the City canal to 
the head of the Tanner Ditrh. 
Immediately upon the signing of this agreement, 
the City comn1enced the work of installing the pipe line 
systen1. finishing the line on 62nd South running in 
front of :Jioyle 's ~i2 acre tract, in the fall of 1921. CI'r. P. 
267-8) The pumping plant 'vas installed in 1924. (Tr. P. 
266) :According· to :Jir. Towler, on July 11, 1928, l\fr. 
Moyle ordered a one inch connection to this 62nd South 
line and later, when this wooden stave pipe line was re-
placed by an iron line, ~Ioyle had this connection changed 
into two one inch connections emptying into a two inch 
line and also caused to be made four one inch connec-
tions empt)ing into a two inch line and a two inch con-
nection en1pt~ing into a two inch line. (Tr. p. 278-79) 
:Jir. :Moyle himself testified that he built his large two 
story home on his property in 1923 and built into it l:Y2 
inch pipes so water could be piped throughout the house, 
upstairs and down stairs, the water coming fron1 the 
main line installed by the City on 62nd South in front 
of his place under the exchange agreen1ent between 
the City ·and the Company. This first connection was 
made in 1923 when he built his home (Tr. p. 84-85 ), and 
consisted of two one inch connections to the wooden 
stave line. Then he had another connection running to 
some cottages. 'Vhen the iron main pipe was installed to 
replace the wooden line, he had two more one inch con-
nections made. None of the connections were metered 
and he received culinary water therefrom without charge 
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except the usual stock assessment levied by the Company 
on its capital stock. (Tr. p. 86-87) He also had the City 
install a two inch connection running into his property 
but from which he has not yet used water. (Tr. p. 343) 
Moyle has been using water from these connections, ex-
cept the latter, for culinary domestic, stock watering, 
and lawn sprinkling purposes since 1923, and he has even 
used it to irrigate his orchard. In the face of all this ac-
ceptance of the benefits of the exchange agreement, Moyle 
still was strenously opposed to the Company entering 
into the agreement. In fact, in February, 1922, he filed 
an action, in evidence as exhibit G, against the Company 
to restrain the Company from delivering its water to the 
City under said agreement clainring the Company had 
no power to make such exchange, such agreement being 
ultra vires. Instead of pressing said action to a con-
clusion, he has let the same lie dormant to this date, 
electing in 1923 to build his pretentious home, connect 
it and his cottages with the culinary pipe lines installed 
under the agreement, ,and make every possible use of 
the water which the City, under said agreement, had 
chlorinated and made fit for human consumption and 
placed in the pipe line system under pressure. 
In addition, Moyle admittedly has used the irriga-
tion water delivered by the City through its pumping 
system to the company to which he was entitled under 
his stock ownership in the company, which gave him 
the extra water in the dry months called for by the 
agreement. 
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On February 13, 1920, after the exchange agreement 
was entered into, the City filed with the State Engineer 
of Utah an application to change the point of diversion 
fron1 the head of the Tanner Ditch to the head of the 
City conduit at the nwuth of Big Cottonwood Canyon, 
all in pursuance to the provisions of said agreement. 
Xotice of this application was duly published and no 
protest was filed by ~Ioyle or anyone else. The applica-
tion was granted September 3, 1920, and no appeal has 
been taken by anyone from the decision of the State 
Engineer. (Exhibit 3) 
Under a decree of court In what is known as the 
Progress Case, a water commissioner was appointed by 
the court to take charge of all the water of Big Cotton-
wood Creek and distribute the same to the various 
ditches, including the Tanner Ditch, according to the de-
cree in that case. (Tr. p. 161) After the State Engineer 
had granted the application for change of diversion, 
(Exhibit 3) the water to which the Tanner Ditch was 
entitled was diverted under the supervision of the water 
commissioner at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon 
in pursuance to the State Engineer's certificate, a point 
above the point of diversion of the Tanner Ditch. (Tr. 
p. 162) rA portion of the year the clear Cottonwood 
Creek water would run into the Tanner Ditch and part 
of the year there would be a commingling of both creek 
and canal water flowing in the Tanner Ditch. After July 
1, the Water Commissioner did not check as to the amount 
of creek water flowing in the ditch as the City could 
furnish canal water in specified quantities under the ex-
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change agreement. This change of diversion began in 
1921 and has continued ever since, so that during the 
four or five years before the order for possession was 
obtained by the City in the so called comdemnation suit, 
and during the time between the granting of that order 
in 1926 and the dismissal of that action in J·anuary 1938, 
and during the time between such dismissal and the in-
stitution of the present action, the diversion of water at 
the City's intake up the Canyon has followed identically 
the same pattern and procedure. The order for posse-
sion in no wise altered or added to the methods pursued. 
In fact, the water commissioner apparently knew noth-
ing about the order for possession and always divided the 
water according to the decree in the Progress Case under 
which he had his appointment and by which his duties 
were defined, except as modified by the order of the State 
Engineer granting the change of diversion in accordance 
with the exchange agreement (Abst. p. 114). 
So far as the water masters appointed by the Ditch 
Company were concerned, they divided and distributed 
the water without regard to the order entered in the 
comdemnation proceedings. George F. Smith, the water 
master from 1923 to 1929, testified that while he was 
water master in the early part of each season when there 
was lots of water he just notified the users verbally when 
to use the water. When it became scarce he issued tickets 
giving the length of time they could use the water on 
each turn. He issued tickets to Moyle for the use of the 
water on the north branch. From 1923 to 1929 he timed 
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the ~~:;4, ~hares in the north branch outside the corpora-
tion to ~Loyle and he used it. (Abst. p. 136-137) 
Horace T. Godfrey has been the water master since 
February, l~l2~), to the present time. Each year he made 
out water tickets as follows: On the. north branch, in 
which branch ~Ioyle owned the 223,4 shares not repre-
sen~ed by stock in the Cmnpany, he issued and delivered 
to ~Ir. ~[oyle water tickets each year covering these 223,4 
shares and an additional 3~ shares representing stock 
owned in the Company entitled to receive water through 
the north branch, making a total of 26 shares all ticketed 
on the same water ticket and handled without any dis-
tinction between shares outside and shares inside the 
corporation. The ticket gave _Moyle the right to use 
the full stream of the North Branch for the full tin1e 
allotted to the total 26 shares shown on the ticket. The 
only years in which he did not ticket these 223,4 shares 
to ~Ir. :Moyle were the years 1936, 1937, and 1938 and 
this omission was at Mr. Moyle's own request. However, 
when he delivered the water ticket in 1936, he delivered 
the same to _i\Irs. l\Ioyle, one of the plaintiffs herein, and 
she wanted to know why there was a reduction in the 
amount of water ticketed to them. Godfrey advised her 
that l\f r. Moyle had advised him he did not want his 
water out of the corporation timed to him any more. 
However, in 1939, he issued tickets to Mr. lVIoyle for the 
full 26 shares. Moyle used the water from the North 
Branch on his place all of the time except the 3 years 
above Inentioned and, in addition, on numerOUS occasions 
Godfrey observed the water running from a 114 or 11;2 
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inch pipe into a ditch in Moyle's property and also run-
ning on his lawn. During all of the time he has been 
water rnaster, Mr. Godfrey also issued tickets to Mr. 
Moyle for the corporate stock owned by him in other 
branches of the ditch. During this time, no one has 
changed the use of water from the North Branch to 
other branches. (Abst. p. 126-133) 
Exhibit 8 is a letter written by :Moyle to Godirey 
stating the number of shares of corporate stock owned 
by him January 30, 1936, and the name of the branch 
out of which the water represented by such stock should 
be taken. 16-1/3 shares were in the South Branch, 
434 shares were in the Main Branch, and only 31;4 shares 
in the North Branch. All of the water represented by the 
stock other than the 314 shares in the North Branch was 
by this letter directed to be delivered as it had theretofore 
been delivered to tracts of land other than the 32 acre, or 
home tract which was supplied from the North Branch. 
He states in the letter as follows: "I desir,e this water 
in the SIOVUth bnanch as heretofore to be allotted to my 
ten acre piece, Pete Riva, and the water in the main 
branch to my five acre piece, Pete Riva, the remainder on 
my home place." In addition to this segregation of the 
place of use of the water, Godfrey also testified that a 
concrete division box has been in use which automatically 
divides the steam so that 30 per cent goes to the north 
branch and 70 per cent goes to the other branches. 
Richard C. Towler, Assistant Engineer of the City 
1n charge of the water supply, testified from definite 
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reeords that in all the year~ from 1926 to 1939 there 
wa::' ah,-ay::' ~onw creek water delivered to the Tanner 
Ditch during the irrigation ~eason, except in 1936, be-
tween August 11 and October 15, when at times all 
water delivered in the ditch was canal water while at 
other tinws part canal water and part creek water was 
deliYered. In the years 1927, 1928, and 1929, all of the 
water supplied during the whole irrigation season was 
clear creek water. In all of the years during the months 
of April, ~Iay, and June and in many of them in the 
month of July, all the water coming into the Tanner 
Ditch for irrigation purposes was clear creek water and 
at times even in the months of August, September, and 
October the water furnished was entirely clear creek 
water. It appears, therefore, that there was only a small 
part of the irrigation season when there was a comming-
ling of creek water and lake water in the Tanner Ditch. 
(Abst. P. 139-141) It further appears from his testi-
mony that in the year 1934, an extremely dry year, there 
was more water delivered in the culinary pipe system 
alone than the Tanner Ditch was entitled to under its en-
tire decreed rights, and that had it not been for the extra 
water which the Tanner Ditch obtained under this ex-
change agreement, the tree growth on Moyle's pro-
pert~- and all crops under the Tanner Ditch would have 
died. (Abst. P. 144-147) ~Ir. Towler likewise has ob-
~erved that l\1r. Moyle used the water for irrigation. 
A two inch pipe under 40 lbs. pressure, which was the 
pressure in the main pipe in front of :Moyle's place, 
would deliver 115,200 gallons of water per 24 hours. As 
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heretofore pointed out, Mr. Moyle had three such con-
nections to the culinary system. 
The record is also conclusive that after the ex-
change agreement was entered into and after the culi-
nary pipe system was installed there was no attempt 
on the part of t~e Company to time or ticket or control 
the use of culinary water drawn from the pipe system. 
No meters were placed on these pipes and no account 
was made as to the quantity of water drawn by those 
using the culinary water. The tickets issued by the water 
masters above referred to relate only to the water turns 
for irrigation. The amount of water which a water user 
would or could use from the pipe system was entirely 
within the control of the user himself. The court in Case 
of Big CottO'YIIWIOIOd T~anner Ditch Co. vs. Shurtliff, .et, al., 
No. 14230, exhibit 2, to which Moyle was a party, en-
tered the following conclusion of law: 
"20th. That on said ditch there is no such 
thing as a culinary right, domestic right, stock 
watering right, fish right, or power right sepa-
rate and distinct or different from an irrigation 
right, but that all of such so called rights are 
Inere uses to which the various owners of rights in 
said ditch have applied the shares of water to 
which they are respectfully entitled.'' 
The court also entered the following conclusion: 
'' 23rd. The Court further finds that the 
plaintiff (Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Com-
pany) is entitled to a decree enjoining and re-
straining all of the defendants in this action (in-
cluding :Mr. Moyle) from interferring with the 
distribution of the water of the Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch in accordance with the rules and 
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regulations adopted fron1 thne to time by the 
owners of the water rights of said Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch.'' 
By the construction of the culinary pipe system the 
users of water, both under stock ownership and under 
shares outside of the corporation, were supplied with 
water for their culinary, domestic, and stock watering 
purposes, which the Court concluded as a matter of law 
in the case Exhibit 2, as heretofore quoted, were simply 
uses attached to the irrigation right and not separate 
and apart from the irrigation right. 
Since this culinary water pipe system made water 
available in continuous flow during the whole of the 
year for culinary, domestic and stock watering purposes, 
the conclusion of the Court in the case above referred to 
the effect that such regulations should be adopted as 
would enable the water users to receive as near a con-
tinuous flow as reasonably possible in order that they 
might have water for culinary, domestic, and stock water-
ing purposes was completely complied with. So far as the 
water users on the Tanner Ditch were concerned when 
that pipe system was installed, there only remained the 
matter of distributing water for irrigation during the 
irrigation season and this was taken care of as testified 
to by the two water masters. 
That the pipe system was designed to and does 
carry the culinary water to users on the Tanner Ditch for 
shares outside the Tanner Ditch Company is evident 
from the testimony of Moyle himself. He testified he 
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asked the City to put in a two inch pipe connection 
with the 62nd South Main, which was done. It extends 
about six inches inside his fence. While he says no 
water was actually drawn from it, he nevertheless testi-
ified ''I .expect t1o use it when I g1e.t my wat.er back.'' 
(Tr. P. 373) Mr. Towler testified it has a valve on it 
which, if properly turned, keeps the water from flow-
ing out. It would also follow that, if turned the other 
way, water would flow out. (Tr. P. 295) The opening 
is there, and, according to Moyle's counsel, connection 
can be made thereto at any time. How Moyle expects 
to get his water hack and delivered to him in the pipe 
line installed under the exchange agreement without 
becoming a real party, and submitting himself and all 
his rights, to such agreement is not explained. This 
intention to use the water through the pipe line was 
evidenced in 1934 in which year the connection was made. 
It is indisputable evidence also that Moyle would be 
perfectly agreeable to having the culinary and domestic 
water to which he was entitled under his 223A shares 
outside the Company delivered to him in the pipe line, 
and that he was prepared to take that water through that 
very identical connection. By the City making that con-
nection and leaving it in such condition that Moyle could 
draw all the water therefrom that such connection would 
deliver, viz., 115,200 gallons per day, was tantamount to 
a direct tender to him of water to that extent. In the 
face of such a situation, how can it be said that the 
City had possession of all his water and refused to per-
mit him to use it~ And furthermore, he had two other 
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ronnection~. one consisting of four one inch connections 
emptying into a two inch pipe, and another consisting of 
two one inch connections emptying into a two inch pipe, 
( Tr. P. :279) each capable of delivering a like amount of 
water each day, and from which connections he admit-
tedly used "·ater. There is not the slightest evidence that 
he could not or did not procure all the culinary and do-
mestic water to which he was entitled under all his shares 
both in and out of the corporation from these two connec-
tions. ~-\.s a rna tter of fact, he himself testified ( Tr. P. 
:3-!-!) that he might have used the water he had both in 
the corporation and outside the corporation from the 
pipe lines. He admits there were no meters on any of the 
lines so there was no way of telling ho\\· much water he 
used. The important fact, however, is that the City per-
mitted him to make these connections and made available 
to him the enormous total of approximately 445,000 gal-
lons of water per day had he chosen to draw from such 
connections. The fact is that he had it within his power to 
use the quantity of water which those connections were 
capable of delivering. He himself testified (Tr. P. 86-87) 
that he was inclined to think that all three connections 
were put in at the same time and that he has had the 
three connections from the time he built his house. 
Edward C. Bagley testified that he leased 40 acres 
of land adjoining Moyle's home place on the West for 
eight years prior to the trial. On the North branch, the 
users take the entire stream of that branch during water 
turns. He would have to go each turn to Moyle's place 
to get his water, he being the next user below. On each 
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occasion during the eight years when he went to get 
his water, it would be diverted onto Moyle's land. Be-
fore he leased this property adjoining Moyle's, he quite 
often had to go to l\1oyle 's place to get the water for 
his own land, and on those occasions he would find the 
water turned onto Moyle's place. The water has been 
turned onto Moyle's place into his ditches ever since 
Bagley lived in that vicinity, a period of more than 
thirty years. (Abst. P. 117-119) 
As shown by Towler's testimony above referred to, 
during the period from 1926 to 1939, there was only a 
very short time in one year, viz. 1936, when creek water 
was not turned down the Tanner Ditch. Under the ex-
change agreement, so far as the Ditch Company and its 
stock holders were concerned, the City was not required 
to turn down any creek water into the ditch, hut could 
supply all water from its lake water, the culinary and 
domestic uses being taken care of by the pipe lines. 
When it did turn down creek water each year, except the 
short period in 1936, it follows that it did not take pos-
session of or keep Moyle's creek water. The evidence is 
without dispute that the City turned down creek water 
which, with the canal water, supplied the Company with 
a total quantity sufficient to give Moyle and all water 
users all the water his and their rights entitled him and 
them to. This is true because the Company every year 
ticketed Moyle his full rights in the Ditch under the 
various branches. He, himself, testified ( Abst. P. 34) ''I 
a-rn inclined to thimk that immediat,ely after this oon-
demnat~on suit the. wat.e.r mast,etr oonti'YlfU)ed to give me 
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the trat.er that 'lras condemned.'' He further testified 
he told the water master he had no water but he was 
not able to state whether it was one, two, or three years, 
or when it was after the condemnation suit that he so 
informed the water master. (Abst. P. 35) Mr. Godfrey, 
the water master, testified it was in 1936 that Moyle 
told him he wasn't entitled to the water, so according, 
to his own testimony, the water master continued to 
give him the water that was condemned until1936. This 
water was not delivered to him in the years 1936, 1937, 
and 1938 at his own request, as heretofore pointed out, 
but it was again delivered to him in 1939 after the con-
demnation suit was dismissed. He also testified that 
it was the custom for him to take his water at the time 
designated on his water tickets and to keep the water 
until the time shown on the tickets expired and the next 
user came and took it. (Abst. P. 45-46) While he dis-
claimed ever using what he called mud~y water, which 
according to the evidence was only delivered in parts 
of the months of July, August, September, and October, 
and sometimes was not delivered at all during the entire 
season, whenever the clear creek water was delivered he 
used it and would just let the water run until the other 
fellow came and took it. 
If the Company had the full quantity of water to 
which the Tanner Ditch was entitled, being a combina-
tion of creek and canal water, it cannot be said that the 
City had or kept possession of Moyle's water. All Moyle 
could object to was a commingling of the creek water 
with the canal water, which thereby decreased the quality 
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of his creek water, a condition which might be inherent 
in the operation of the exchange agreement, but which 
certainly could not be held to be the equivalent of a 
taking and possessing by the City. Moyle himself recog-
nized that his proper remedy was against the Ditch Com-
pany to prevent it from exchanging the creek water 
under the exchange agreement, and he commenced an 
action to that end in 1922, which is in evidence as exhibit 
G. The City did not enter into that controversy, though 
an order was entered requiring Moyle to make the City 
a party. J\1oyle permitted that suit to lie dormant so far 
as making the city a party and four years later the 
City brought the condemnation suit and obtained an 
order for immediate possession. But, it should be kept 
in mind, that such order was not self executing-even 
with the order the City could, and by all the evidence did, 
continue to let creek water run down in the Tanner Ditch 
all of every irrigation season except 1936 as heretofore 
indicated. During the remainder of every year, creek 
water alone was available to the North branch users 
either in the ditch itself or in the pipe lines to the full 
extent of their water rights. 
Certainly, simply because the City had obtained a 
Court order giving it permission to take possession, did 
not mean that the City was compelled to take possession 
nor did it prevent the City from turning down creek 
water whenever it so desired. The order for possession 
was 1nerely permissive and whether it was availed of 
would be a matter of proof and the proof all ·shows, as 
we have demonstrated, that the City did not elect to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
take exclu~ive and entire possession of all the creek 
water to which the Tanner Ditch was entitled. 
The burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to show 
that the City had in fart taken actual possession of all of 
the water to which plaintiffs were entitled under their 
22~~ shares. The procurement of the Court order giving 
the City immediate possession was merely proof of in-
tention to take possession and legal sanction for the tak-
ing; but it did not accomplish the taking and possessing. 
That could only be done by the City actually diverting 
all of ~Ioyle's water into its conduit at the mouth of 
the canyon and in not permitting any of it to reach the 
~orth branch diversion box. Instead of producing testi-
mony to prove such diversion, ~Ioyle, himself, testified, 
as above shown, that the water masters continued to 
supply him the condemned water for several years, and 
according to Godfrey ten years, after the order giving 
possession was granted and the only year when this 
water was not supplied were the years that Moyle speci-
fically requested the water master not to deliver it. All 
that :Moyle testified to was that he refused to use the 
"muddy" water. He had no hesitancy in using all the 
piped water he wanted; in fact he built his pretentious 
home only when assured the piped water would be 
available. He always used the creek water when it was 
not commingled with the lake water. He uBed that water, 
according to his own testimony, as specified in the 
turns allotted to him in his water tickets. Those tickets 
specifically fixed the turns covering the, very 22% shares 
\vhich he had the burden of showing the City took away 
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from him. That the water masters ticketed to him this 
water; that the water was available in the north branch 
for his use; that he used water according to his ticketed 
turns; all this is not only undisputed, but it is testified to 
by himself. In the face of all this his inconsistent state-
nlent. by way of a conclusion that he tried not to use 
the water represented by these shares and thinks he did 
not use it can have no weight as evidence. When the con-
demned water was made available to him each year, he 
claims he informed the Company he would not have 
it because it was condemned, but he nevertheless took 
and used it both through the pipe system and through 
the open ditch. 
It might be said that the water used by him on 
his home tract of 32 acres was only water to which he 
was entitled under his stock ownership. We confidently 
assert that there is not a scintilla of evidence to sup-
port such a position. The facts we have already referred 
to disprove it. Under the articles of incorporation of the 
Ditch Company, he could not transfer to the north branch 
any water from the main or south branches without the 
consent of the other stock holders. There is an entire 
absence of proof of such consent and Godfrey testified 
no transfer was made. Moyle's own letter, exhibit 8, 
shows that all his rights under his stock ownership, ex-
cept 31,4, shares, were specifically alloted to the main 
and south 'branches in which they were issued. All these 
main and south branch shares had been and were to 
be used by Moyle's own direction by Pete Riva on the 
10 acre and 5 acre tracts. The 3~ shares were the only 
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stock shares that could be used to supply water to the 
home tract. If ~Ioyle had lim.ited his use of water on 
this tract to the rights represented by these 314 shares, 
it would have been very siinple for him to have testified 
that while he was ticketed for 26 shares he in fact used 
water only that fractional part of the time which the 
311~ shares represented on the tickets, to wit: 3% over 
26, or Ys of the time allotted. Instead of so testifying, 
he testified he used his turns at least when creek water 
was available and let it run until the next user (who was 
Bagley) came and took it. As to the culinary water, he 
had no way of knowing when he had used his 314 shares 
worth, and even admits that he may have used n1ore 
than his stock ownership entitled him to. 
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the record, 
we shall proceed to advert to the specific grounds for 
rehearing stated in our petition. 
GROUNDS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
The majority opinion makes the following state-
ment: "The point is urged that after the order granting 
the City possession, Moyle was still issued tickets by 
the water master for his irrigation turns the same as 
before the order and, therefore, he was deprived of no 
water. This is specious argument. He does not sue for 
crop damage for lack of irrigation water. H·e had other 
ir.rigation wat1er rights in the Big OoUonwood Tanrner 
Ditch which he us,ed for irrig,atitn.g his crops, and which 
was sufficient for that purpose. The water right hereim 
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imvolved was a right in .exoess of what he requir,ed for 
irrig,ation d"Uring those yeo.lfs, a(fl.d which he could have 
sold .or 'tiented had the City nJot t·aken the W!ater. '' The 
following points are thus asserted and relied upon in the 
affirmance of the judgment: (1) That Moyle is not 
suing for crop damage for lack of irrigation water, 
because (2) he had other irrigation water sufficient for 
the purpose. ( 3) The water right taken over by the 
City was in excess of what he required for irrigation 
during those years (1926-1939) : and ( 4) this excess 
water he could have sold or rented if the City had not 
taken it. 
Because this view of the record must of necessity 
had such an extremely important bearing on the de-
cision reached and because such view is wholly untenable 
we feel bound here to refer again to the matters and 
record already reviewed. 
In his complaint, Moyle alleged that these 22%, 
shares of water right were at all times complained of 
appurtenant to his land in the Southeast quarter of the 
Southeast quarter of Section 15, which was this 32 acre 
horne tract. Such a right could only come into being 
and continue to live and exist as an appurtenance to 
that land because the water represented thereby had been 
and was being put to beneficial uses upon the same. 
:Moyle testified the he required this water to irrigate 
this tract, not for the purpose of raising farm crops it 
is true, but for the purpose of irrigating the native trees 
and shrubs which covered approximately half of this 
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tract, and in addition to irrigate his orchard, pasture, 
lawn, and grass, and to beautify this tract, and that 
it was because the City by the order of possession pre-
Yentecl a continuation of such use that he brought this 
action. Here is a summary of his testimony: The 22%~: 
shares were appurtenant to this tract. (Tr. P. 57) He 
used all this water both that that is in the corporation· 
and that that is out of the corporation on this property 
and other property. (Tr. P. 63) On the 32 acre tract 
he used part water represented by stock and the rest 
by shares outside of the corporation. (Tr. P. 65) That 
part used was allotted by the officers of the Ditch 
Company and they allotted both the stock shares ( 31,4 
shares) and the 2234 shares on the same ticket. When 
asked what use he made of that water, he testified: "I 
used it almost all the time on these 32 acres. (Tr. P. 66)" 
During all the years prior to 1926 he put all this water to 
use on his home tract, on his orchard, trees, in front of his 
house, and on shrubs and bushes, and for beautification. 
(Tr. P. 90) His land was not adapted to farming so 
he used all his water for trees and beautification. (Tr. 
P. 109) Prior to 1926 it was his custom to use his water 
to irrigate trees, grass, shrubs, garden, alfalfa, and to 
beautify the place. (Tr. P. 142) He ran a ditch frorn 
the Southeast corner of this tract North along the East 
side and then Westerly. Another ditch was run West 
from this ditch at about the center of the East line to 
water ground planted to oats and alfalfa. It would like-
wise carry water to the trees. More than half of this 
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tract was covered with trees. Then he took a ditch out 
of the North Branch running Northwesterly South of 
his house from which he irrigated half an acre and also 
the orchard. He also had 2 acres where he grew a garden 
and some fine strawberries. He also had a clover patch 
and some pasture land which he irrigated. All these 
areas he irrigated before 1926. After that one of the 
ditches and pipes were abandoned. The ditch he refers 
to isn't clear in the record, but the ditch is still there 
but hasn't been used, except in the spring a little water 
comes drown from the Judge property ditch. (Tr. P. 
331-342) 
Such was the user, testified to by Moyle himself, 
that preserved this water right as an appurtenance to 
this 32 acre tract. That he considered all the water 
represented by those 22% shares was necessary to pro-
perly irrigate that particular tract, being a ''gravelly 
soil," is borne out by the foregoing testimony and fur-
ther by :Moyle's answer in the action in evidence as ex-
hibit 2, the Shurtleff Case, wherein he claimed that in 
addition to the 22% shares he and his predecessors 
since 1893 had beneficially used for irrigation purpose, 
a stream of water running ten inches deep and 2;/z feet 
wide four days a week to produce crops on this 32 acre 
tract. There is not the slightest evidence that suddenly 
and without any apparent reason in 1926 Moyle had 
no need for this water represented by these 22% shares 
to irrigate this tract or that he had other water rights 
on the ditch which he used for irrigating this land which 
were sufficient for that purpose. It should be remem-
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bered that under the articles of incorporation he could 
not use the corporation stock water rights to irrigate 
this land without tlw consent of the other stock holders, 
and the eYidence is that no transfer or use frorn one 
branch to another was Inade. By his own direction, as 
shown by exhibit S. he was using all his other water 
rights on his ten acre and five acre tracts which left no 
water to irrigate the 32 acre tract except that represented 
by 3~,~ shares of stock and the 22% shares, and it is 
without dispute that the water master ticketed his other 
shares of stock in the Company to the South Branch 
and the ~[ain Branch. 
Likewise, there is absolutely no evidence to sustain 
the statement that these 2234 shares represented water 
in excess of what was required for irrigation during 
the years 1926 to the time of trial. If it was excess water 
in 1926, how and when did it become such 1 If it was ex-
cess water then, it must have always been excess water 
unless some special conditions intervened and there 
is no testimony of any changed conditions. Certainly 
it did not become excess water because the City obtained 
the order of possession. It could only become excess 
water because ~Ioyle no longer had use for it for irri-
gation purposes on this 32 acre tract. But the testimony, 
as reviewed, shows that Moyle claimed he used it all in 
the years 1921 to 1925 inclusive, the years the exchange 
agreen1ent was effective before the order of possession 
was granted. It also shows he claimed he used it all dur-
ing all the years prior thereto since he owned the place. 
There is no evidence at all that in 1926 or any other 
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time he decided to discontinue use of this water for irri-
gating this tract. The evidence is that his water tickets 
covered these shares for irrigating this tract and no 
other tickets were issued for this tract. If the evidence 
did not show a user for irrigation purposes during those 
years since 1901, when he acquired the property, to 
1926, then it must follow Moyle had no irrigation rights, 
for it is only by use that such rights continue to exist. 
Furthermore, the statement by the majority opin-
ion that the water right involved was a right in excess 
of what was requjred for irrigation, he having suf-
ficient other irrigation water for his crops, which excess 
he could have sold or rented had the City not taken the 
water, completely ignores the culinary and domestic 
rights which these 22%, shares represented. It must be 
assumed that the excess water was the water represented 
by those shares. According to the testimony, the culinary 
and domestic rights constituted a very important part 
of the water rights represented by these shares and 
were important in fixing the rental value thereof. Does 
the majority opinion mean by this language that what 
the City took was only the excess irrigation water for 
which Moyle had no need during the years covered by 
the order of possession and that Moyle must have re-
ceived his culinary and domestic water~ If so, then 
the City did not take possession of his entire rights 
represented by these shares and the case should be re-
versed, because the judgment of the trial court is clearly 
based upon the proposition that Moyle was completely 
dispossessed of all rights represented by these shares. 
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The rnajority opinion next sweeps aside the con-
tention of the City and all of the eYidence hereinbefore 
reYiewed to the effeet that the City did not actuall~, 
take ~[oyle ·~ \Yater ~inee ereek water was actually fur-
nished to the Tanner Ditch at all times in every year, 
except a short time in 1936 and during smne years ( 1927, 
l~l2S. 1929) no lake ,,,ater at all \Yas in the ditch, by the 
simple process of postulating that "if the City used 
this ~Ioyle ·water as part of the water it delivered to the 
Corporation under the exchange agreement it had pos-
session of it.~' The opinion further says that the record 
conelusiYely shows that all creek water not diverted 
into the City ~Iains under the exchange agreement was 
used by the City in supplying the Corporation with the 
volume of water it was obligated to supply to the Cor-
poration. On the contrary, we respectfully submit that 
there is absolutely no basis in the record to assurne 
that the City furnished the Jioyle water to the Corpora-
tion to make up the water it was bound to deliver to the 
Corporation under the exchange agreement. This is in-
disputably true because, in the first place, the City was 
obligated under the exchange agreement to deliver to 
the Corporation only the same quantity of water the 
Corporation, as such, was entitled to in the Big Cot-
tonwood Tanner Ditch, plus the bonus water in the dry 
months. The Corporation had no interest in or right to 
that quantity of water represented by Moyle's 223;4 
shares outside the Corporation. It did not exchange that 
quantity of water nor did the City undertake to deliver 
to the Corporation water in lieu thereof. When the City 
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furnished that quantity of water to which the Corpora-
tion was entitled, it fully discharged its part of the 
agreement. 
In the second place, there was actually delivered 
into the Tanner Ditch not only the quantity of water 
to which the Corporation as such was entitled, but there 
was also delivered therein an additional quantity at 
all times sufficient in amount to supply 1\1oyle all the 
water represented by his 22%, shares. This is demon-
strated beyond all cavil by the fact that the Corpora-
tion ticketed this water to him and assigned to him the 
turns in hours to which those shares entitled him and 
the water was there flowing in the ditch during those 
hours. This occurred every year except 1936, 1937, 
1938 when by Moyle's own request this water was not 
ticketed to him, but in those years, this water was de-
livered into the ditch and was used by James H. Moyle. 
Furthermore, the exchange agreement was in effect four 
years before the order of possession was obtained and 
the delivery of canal water occurred two years before 
that order was granted. And during all these years :Moyle 
got his water. This conclusively shows that the City 
did not need and was not using Moyle's water to supply 
the corporation with the water contemplated by the 
exchange agreement. 
In the 3rd place, the majority opinion itself con-
tradicts its own statement above referred to when it 
goes on to say that during the years 1936, 1937, 1938, 
the ''Corporation did not even issue to Moyles a time 
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or turn ticket for the 223,4~, shares of water herein in-
volved, but distributed that ti.me and wat,er to other 
stock holders in the Corporation.'' If the Corporation 
distributed this water to some other stock holders then 
the City must not have retained possession of it, but on 
the contrary must have supplied it to the Corporation in 
the ditch. If the Corporation had the water represented 
by these shares available for distribution during those 
three years and did actually distribute it to someone 
other than ~Ioyle, then, of course, the City must have 
supplied more water than that necessary to meet its 
exchange agreement and did not use Moyle's water 
to make up the quantity it was bound to furnish to the 
Corporation as such under its agreement. 
Furthermore, the opinion entirely omits to state 
that the reason this water represented by the 2234 shares 
was not ticketed and distributed to Moyle was because 
he expressly instructed the water master, Godfrey, not 
to issue him a ticket for or distribute to him this water 
during those years. (Tr. P. 230) The water was used 
by his brother, James H. }foyle and was again ticketed 
to plaintiff in 1939 on direction of Henry D. Moyle, 
director and attorney for the Corporation. Some of 
the water tickets issued to Moyle are in evidence and 
show conclusively that his full water rights were avail-
able to him. He claims he did not use it and the Court 
apparently chooses to believe this even in spite of the 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary from the water 
masters and the water engineer, Mr. Towler, and from 
:Mr. Bagley who took the water right after Moyle's turn 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
ended, and in the face of the indisputable fact that the 
Company so distributed the water of the ditch that the 
water actually ran through the North Branch divide 
for the Moyle place the 13 hours or 26 hours in the turns 
which represented Moyle's rights for irrigation as shown 
by the water tickets (exhibits 4, 5, and 6). That water 
just didn't come to the division box and stay there. It 
kept running. It didn't go down to Bagley, the next 
user, before his turn started. He went up and got 
it at Moyle's place every turn and every time he found 
it running into Moyle's place. That evidence stands ab-
solutely uncontradicted except by Mr. Moyle's assertion 
that he tried not to use the water and in his opinion 
he did not use it. But he himself admits he used the 
creek water in the months when no lake water was 
commingled therewith. 
In addition, Moyle himself testified that ''after 
this condemnation suit the water master continued to 
give me the water that was condemned." (Tr. P. 75) He 
says, ''for some time after 1926 the watermaster didn't 
recognize this condemnation because I had took it up 
with them a lot of times and they finally did so; I say 
I didn't know when they cut it down.'' He didn't have 
any judgment as to approximately when they cut it 
down; doesn't know whether it would be within a year 
or two years or three years, or what after the con-
demnation. (Tr. P. 77) He could not estimate how 
,many hours the water would run on the land or whether 
it was in the day time. He had a boy there. (Tr. 96) Af-
ter an extensive cross examination he finally admitted 
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he had no idea how long the water wa8 allowed to run 
on hi~ hmne place or whether it was in the day timP, 
because he didn't do the irrigating; he had a boy there 
to do it. 
The water to which :Moyle was entitled under his 
shares of stoek. by his own letter, Exhibit 8, had always 
been used fron1 the ~lain and South Bra11ches by Pete 
Riva, and were to continue to be so used so he did not use 
that water on his home place nor did he have anything 
to do with the use of that water. When he says he let 
the water run \vhen it was clear creek water until the 
next man came for it he could not be referring to the 
water Pete Riva was using on the ten and five acre 
tracts. He must have had reference to the use of water 
on his home tract. 
We refer the Court again to the undisputed testi-
mony of Bagley, the water user who took the North 
Branch water after Moyle's turn. On each turn for 
eight years he had to go to Moyle's place to get his 
water and every time he found it still running into 
Moyle's place when his turn began. The Company always 
had water in sufficient quantity to supply Moyle his 
full water rights. This water was ticketed to him in 
regular turns and the water was actually flowing in 
the ditch and through the divide into the North Branch 
at Moyle's place and was there interrupted by some 
one and turned into Moyle's property for it was not 
allowed to run on down to Bagley's place until he came 
up and took it. 
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The opinion makes much of the point that as soon 
as the order for possession was granted it was Moyle's 
duty not to use the water represented by the 223,4 shares. 
Of course, he would have had no right to take such 
water away from the City, if the City insisted on using 
it. But it should be remembered that the distribution 
system was such that there was no way for Moyle 
to receive and take creek water except such as flowed 
past the Cit)''s intake up the canyon. Any creek water 
which flowed past the intake was not held by the City 
under the order of possession. In all of the years 1927, 
1928, 1929, nothing but creek water flowed in. the Tan-
ner Ditch, and in addition, culinary water was furnished 
through the pipe system. As already shown, clear creek 
water flowed in the Tanner Ditch during all of April, 
May, and June, and parts of July, August, September, 
and October of every year except 1936, when for a short 
period in the fail only lake water flowed in the Ditch. 
The period of April, May and June is the high water 
period when there is more water than all rights combined 
can use. If the condemnor voluntarily relinquishes pos-
session of all or a part of the property there is then 
no duty resting upon the condemnee to refrain from 
using it. Just the reverse, it is his duty to use it and 
thus mitigate the damages he would otherwise suffer. 
This principle is admitted by plaintiff themselves. Coun-
sel stated to the Trial Court (Tr. P. 316) with reference 
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to the Inateriality of evidence showing use by Moyle 
of the water involved: 
·' \Y e could hardly claim damages for it (the 
water) if we used it at least to the extent that 
it would Initigate the dmnage, that would be 
competent evidence. "\V e claim we have not used 
it at all, not a drop." 
In 18 ~-\.n1. J ur. p 903 Sec. 262, Eminent Do-
Inain, is the following: 
"It is the duty of the owner, so far as reas-
onably possible, to attempt to minimize his dam-
ages by salvaging what he can from the property 
taken. Thus, where growing crops are destroyed, 
it is his duty, if he has the opportunity, to care 
for such perishable property. So also, it is his 
duty to use all reasonable exertion to protect him-
self, and avert, as far as practicable, the injuriou~ 
consequences of the taking.'' 
ENID and A. RY. CO. vs. WILEY-Okla.,- 78 
P. 96. In this case the Railroad sought to condemn a 
right of way. Appraisers were appointed and fixed the 
damage at $600.00. That amount was deposited, hut the 
land owner refused to accept it and demanded a jury 
trial. Pending these procedings, the Cmnpany entered 
the land and excavated for its roadbed and disfigured 
about sixteen acres. It then obtain other land and dis-
missed the proceedings. The land owner then instituted 
an action for damages. The Court says: 
''We do not think the value of the land 
sought to be taken and upon which the injuries 
are committed should be the test of the limit of 
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recovery. This rule may well be applied where 
land is actually taken. The measure of damages 
as stated in Sedgwick on Damages, Sec. 939 (8 
Ed.), is the cost of restoring the land to its for-
Iner condition, with compensation for loss of it, 
if this all together is less than the diminution in 
value of the land with the injuries left standing. 
This is on the principle that, if the cost of repair-
ing the injuries is greater than the diminution in 
market value of the land, the latter is the true 
measure of damages; the rule of avoidable con-
sequences requiring that in such case the plain-
tiff shall diminish the loss as much as possible.'' 
In DES MOINES WET WASH LAUNDRY vs. 
DES JJ10INES,-Iowa-, 198 N.\V. 486, 34 A. L. R. 1517, 
the City sought to condemn a tract on which was a build-
ing leased and used by the plaintiff as a laundry. On 
mitigation of damages the Court says: 
"Plaintiff's lease hold was commandeered 
and the obligation was upon plaintiff to mini-
mize the consequent damage. One way of doing 
this, and which was done, was to secure other 
quarters.'' 
The order for possession reads as follows: 
"That Salt Lake City, plaintiff herein, is 
hereby authorized to take all the water of Big 
Cottonwood Creek now flowing in Big Cotton-
wood Tanner Ditch and to turn into said Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch other water suitable 
for irrigation in lieu and place of the Big Cot-
tonwood Creek water so taken therefrom by 
plaintiff, and it is further ordered that as soon 
as possible plaintiff shall in water pipe furnish 
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to and n1ake available to defendants for domestic 
and culinary purposes sufficient creek water in 
Big Cottonwood Creek.'' 
Certainly it was :Moyle's duty to use the water thus 
to be n1ade available to him pending the final disposi-
tion of the case and thus keep his damages at a minimum. 
If the water so furnished did not equal in rental value 
the water taken, it nevertheless had some value whether 
used by :Moyle himself or rented by him and Moyle could 
not wilfully and stubbornly refuse to use or accept 
of it. If he could have rented or sold the water taken 
by the City, he also could have rented or sold the water 
which the order obligated the City to furnish and which 
all of the evidence shows was actually furnished. Mr. 
Towler testified that the water furnished under the ex-
change agreement to stockholders, which was the same 
kind of water which was made available to Moyle, was 
worth twice as much both in rental and sale value as 
was the water Moyle claims the City took (Tr. P. 307) 
The fact is, as we have demonstrated, Moyle did use 
the water, both that which flowed in the Tanner Ditch 
and that which was piped to his place, and he built a 
spacious home so he could use the water so delivered 
under pressure. 
Further, the order did not require the City to at 
all times take all of the creek water to which the Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch was entitled. The City was 
simply authorized to take and to replace what it took 
with other irrigation water, and was also required to 
furnish domestic and culinary water in the pipe system 
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out limitation. The City could have refrained from taking 
any water under this order or it could take such part 
as it needed, furnishing other irrigation water in lieu 
thereof, but being obligated to furnish creek water in 
pipes s11fficient for !foyle's culinary and domestic use. 
The opinion Inakes the point that the commingling 
of creek and lake water was a taking pro tanto. While 
we seriously question this proposition, as we shall later 
develop, if it is a taking pro tanto it is not a complete 
taking and credit should have been given for the value 
of that which was not taken. 
IV 
GROUND 7 
The decision both of the trial court and this court 
is based on a taking of Moyle's water by the City under 
an order for possession granted in condemnation pro-
ceedings. That order of possession was dismissed Jan-
nary 7, 1938, when the entire proceeding was dismissed. 
The order of dismissal states: 
''The court having sustained the demurrer 
imposed by the defendant in the above entitled 
case and the attorneys for plaintiff having stated 
in open court that they did not desire to amend 
their complaint but chose to stand on the com-
plaint without amendment it is therefore or-
dered that the above entitled case be and the 
same here by is dismissed. ' ' 
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There was nothing surreptitious about such dis-
Inissal. The defendants in that case, the plaintiffs here, 
interposed the demurrer and they knew it had been sus-
tained, and they also knew that the City would either 
have to amend or stand a dismissal. If 1\foyles had any 
interest whatever in the case they would have been 
fully advised of the dismissal. It was in the record-
the decision not to amend was made in open Court. 
Furthermore, the City had a right to dismiss the case 
at any time on its own motion. The implication that the 
City sneaked over a dismissal to the prejudice of the 
~Ioyles, keeping the fact a dark secret, is wholly unfair 
and without foundation. 
After the dismissal the City was not holding Moyle's 
water under the order for possession. The year 1938 
was one of the years ~Ioyle told the water master not to 
give him turns for these 2234 shares and the water 
represented by those shares, according to the Court's 
own opinion, was used by other stock holders and hence 
was not used by the City. In 1939 the water was again 
ticketed to :Moyle just the same as it had always been 
even before the order for possession was granted. There 
apparently was no taking of Moyle's water between 
1921 and 1926 before the order for possession was en-
tered, although the exchange agreement had been in 
effect during that time and the lake water had been 
commingled with the creek water, as his complaint is 
based entirely upon a taking under the order and a 
failure to return the water after its dismissal. If Moyle 
was ticketed and had available to him in 1939 and since 
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the water to which he was entitled in the same manner as 
before 1926, then there must have been a return to him 
of his water. And the record is conclusive that this is 
what happened. After the order was dismissed the City 
was not taking as a condemnor-if it took any water it 
took it as a trespasser and it could only be liable for 
that water which it actually took. The clear water was 
in the ditch in 1939 during April, May, June and until 
July 10. F,rom July 10 to October 15th, Lake water was 
added. (Tr. P. 272) Moyles then knew the order was 
dismissed for on April 17, 1939, they filed their claim 
for damages reciting the fact of dismissal. Clearly 
then, for the years 1938 and 1939 plaintiffs were not 
entitled to a judgment based upon a taking by the City 
of all their water rights under these 22% shares. 
In addition to giving plaintiffs the full rental value 
of the 223;4 shares based upon l\ioyle 's testimony of value 
for the year 1938 and 1939, the Court also gave judg-
ment based upon that same estimate of value for the 
time intervening between the filing of the action and 
the time of judgment, a period of over a year, award-
ing the sum of $350.00. This was done without the filing 
of any supplemental pleadings or any amendment to 
the complaint. We submit that such an award was gross 
error. 
17 C.J. p 1000, Section 303: 
The assessment of damages is usually 
governed by the situation or condition of affairs 
existing at the time the action is brough; hence 
for a recovery of loss or damages occurring 
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thereafter, plaintiffs should amend or file a 
supplemental petition.'' 
17 C.J. p 1085, Section 395 : 
''As a general rule, damages are to be 
assessed as of the date at which action is brought, 
and only such damages as have then accrued may 
be awarded either in actions of contract or of 
tort. Plaintiff can recover only for such damages 
as are the consequences of what defendant did 
before action was brought. Damages which have 
accrued after the action is begun may be allowed 
where they are the consequence of acts done 
before the beginning of the action and constitute 
a part of the cause of action declared on.'' 
See also 25 C.J.S. p 751, Section 130 (c), and p 
907, Section 193. 
There is another feature to this question. The opin-
ion states that the commingling of lake and creek water 
was a taking by the City pro tanto. The fact is that 
the City's intake is high up in the Canyon and the creek 
water that flows past its intake continues on down the 
creek to a point at the head of the Tanner Ditch where 
the ditch's portion of the creek flow is received. It is 
at this last point that the lake water is emptied into the 
Tanner Ditch from the city's pumping plant under 
the exchange agreement, and it is here and by virtue of 
that agreement that the commingling takes place. Under 
these conditions can it be said that the City is the one 
that has taken the water pro tanto or any creek water? 
Is it to be charged with the trespass~· The Ditch Com-
pany is the distributing agency whose duty it is to 
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see that the water users on the Ditch get the water 
they are entitled to, not the City. 
It is undoubtedly Moyle's position that no return 
of his water can ever take place until either the ex-
change agreement is abrogated so creek water will al-
ways flow down to his place in the Tanner Ditch un-
commingled with lake water or a separate conduit is 
provided him to carry his portion of the creek water 
to him. And such conduit could only be a pipe line, for 
no open channel would carry that quantity of water 
and in the turns of use which he is required to take 
without substantial loss. But Moyle, as a stock holder in 
the Company, can also insist that the exchange agree-
ment be complied with-that the City furnish the lake 
water in amounts sufficient to make up the quantity 
agreed to be delivered by the City. Under the ruling of 
this court in Etast Mill Or.e1ek mater Oom'Pany vs. Salt 
Lake O~ty,. .. -------~-------------Utah ________________________ , 159 P. 2d. 863, 
he, as a stock holder, is a beneficiary under such agree-
ment, entitled to bring an action to compel performance. 
The effect of the Court's decision therefore is to place 
the City in the position of a trespasser if it complies 
with the agreement giving Moyle a right to recover 
damages for such trespass, while on the other hand 
if the City fails to comply with the agreement it may 
be compelled by Moyle as a beneficiary thereunder to 
make performance. 
The Court allows no diminution of damages in the 
trespass action for the water made available to Moyle. 
If, from a legal standpoint, the exchange agreement is 
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impossible of performance without depriving Moyle of 
his water rights, should the burden of paying the re-
sulting damages fall upon the City as if it were, the 
culpable party to the contract .that brought about and 
was responsible for the unavoidable effects of the con-
tract? The commingling of lake water with the creek 
water is not the act of the City. The City merely de-
livers the lake water to the Company at a point desig-
nated by the Company. Moyle commenced an action 
against the Company in 1922; the files being in evidence 
as exhibit G, to enjoin the delivery of creek water by 
the Company to the City as being ultra vires and that 
action is still pending. He was ordered to make the 
City a party, but he has never done so in the twenty-
four years that have since elapsed. 
In 1920, after the exchange agreement was entered 
into, the City filed an appiication with the State En-
gineer to change the point of diversion from the head 
of the Tanner Ditch to the head of the City conduit 
farther up the Canyon so it could take the creek water 
at its conduit. A certified copy of that application to-
gether with the action taken by the State Engineer is 
in evidence as exhibit 3. This exhibit shows that notice 
of hearing on said application was published in the 
Deseret News from April 19 to May 19, 1920; but no 
protests of any kind, not even by Moyle, was filed. That 
the application was granted September 3, 1920. Moyle 
must be held to have had notice under the statute. Fur-
thermore he well knew that if the application was 
granted, the exchange agreement would be made ef-
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fective and that the inevitable consequence would be 
that lake water would be delivered to the Company as 
provided for in the exchange agreement. Not withstand-
ing this knowledge, he filed no protest nor did he appeal 
from the decision of the State Engineer. He has per-
mitted his action to enjoin the Company from perform-
ing under said agreement to lie dormant for 24 years. 
In addition he has used the water pipe system which 
was installed under the exchange agreement and has 
received the benefits of such system delivering water 
under pressure and thus~ eliminating taking water for 
culinary and domestic purposes from an open ditch. We 
submit that under such facts and conditions, the plain-
tiffs are now estopped from taking a position that places 
the City in the position of a trespasser in the perform-
ance of the exchange agreement. He must now be held 
to have acquiesced in any change thus brought about to 
his water right. He has not been deprived of water suit-
able for any of the purposes to which he had been using 
it. He has been receiving or has had made available to 
him all the water that he was entitled to use either for 
irrigation or for culinary and domestic purposes. 
v 
GROUNDS 9, 10, and 11 
The grounds for rehearing relied on in this group 
relate to the fundamental error in the decision arising 
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from the failure to keep in 1nind the nature of the pro-
perty right inYolved, and consequently the correct meas-
ure of damages which should be applied. Since these 
n1atters are so ably and exhaustively covered by Justice 
'Volfe in his dissenting opinion, we incorporate that 
opinion as a part hereof. We desire only to add the 
following observations. 
This case is unlike the Shurtliff and Sigurd cases 
in that here there is no permanent taking of the water, 
whereas in those cases the taking was permanent and 
the owner of the water right lost the right in its entirety. 
Here there is only a temporary interference with the 
right to use water. Surely in such a situation the own-
er's damages should be measured by the use which he 
lost. He should not be permitted to be enriched by a 
value based upon a possible use which could only result 
· from a permanent taking. The right which Moyle had was 
to take a certain amount of water from the Tanner Ditch; 
he could not have sold or leased anything else. It was that 
right which was interferred with, and he lost only what 
that right would have meant to him~~~ch interference. 
The value of that right cannot be predi&ed upon a pos-
sible use which could be made if the taking were perman-
ent, nor is the value to be found by considering that the 
water might have been put in pipes or reservoirs or that 
it could have been taken out at some other point of 
diversion where it could be put under pressure and used 
entirely for culinary and domestic use. 
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As we have already pointed out, the record is con-
clusive that plaintiffs in fact have received all of the 
Big Cottonwood Creek water to which they were en-
titled under their 22% shares for culinary and domestic 
purposes through the pipe system installed under the 
exchange agreement. This being a fact, the judgment of 
the Trial Court should be reversed because it fails to 
diminish the amount of damages by the reasonable rental 
value of the water so delivered. 
VII 
GROUND 13 
The opinion entirely ignores the assignment of error 
which relate to the action of the Trial Court in enter-
ing judgment for the return to Moyle of 22%, shares of 
water right in the Big Cottonwood Stream and in de-
creeing that plaintiffs' water rights were the same water 
as that decreed to Oscar W. Moyle in the Progress case 
and the Big Oott'owwo10d Tanner Ditch Company vs. 
Shurtliff case, and decreeing that the plaintiff should 
recover from defendant the use and possession from 
the water of Big Cottonwood Stream described as 223_4 
shares water right in said stream. In the first place, 
such a decree was entirely unnecessary to a disposition 
of the issues presented by the pleadings. In the second 
place, the evidence is conclusive that the 223_4 shares 
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were shares in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and 
not in the Big Cottonwood Strean1. It is true the water 
of the Tanner Ditch came from the Big Cottonwood 
Stream, but :Jioyle · s shares represent a certain portion 
of the Tanner Ditch Company's right and not a certain 
proportion of the Big Cottonwood Stream as a whole. 
The drcree is therefore misleading in describing a water 
right in the ~Ioyles which they do not own and in de-
creeing that the City return a water right which is im-
possible to define and to which the plaintiffs are not 
entitled. 
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit 
that this petition for rehearing should be granted and 
the cause set for rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. P. KESLER 
City Attorney, 
Assistant City Attorneys, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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